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Value choices in a mixed economy of care: how politics shapes the 
implementation of complex social policies 
Abstract 
While new social and public policy recognises the diversity of actors and 
processes occurring in the implementation of policy and the organisation of 
public service delivery, the analysis of the role of value pluralism in 
implementation remains underdeveloped.  This paper contributes to a more 
nuanced understanding of the relationship between value pluralism and 
organisational responses to value conflict by exploring the effect of politics on 
the value choices of senior public servants involved in the design and 
implementation of Australia’s National Disability Insurance Scheme.   Our 
analysis shows that politics may play an essential role in facilitating 
implementation of a complex social policy that contains a number of 
incommensurable values because successful politics allows these 
incommensurable values to co-exist and adaptation to take place, thereby 
avoiding the creation of a blocked hybrid.  
 
Introduction 
Over the last fifteen years there has been a resurgence of interest in policy 
implementation studies (Barrett 2004; Exworthy and Powell 2004; Hill and 
Hupe 2009; Carey Dickinson & Olney 2017; Schofield 2001, 2004).  In part, this 
has emerged from a range of high profile policy implementation failures in OECD 
countries (OECD 2010).  This revival has occurred as public administration and 
management begins to transition into a new phase, albeit through a range of 
processes and driving logics (Head and Alford 2015).  It has recently been 
argued that we are entering a new stage of government-policy network relations 
– termed New Public Governance (Osborne 2010). New public governance (NPG) 
is said to recognize better the diverse range of actors as well as the diverse range 
of processes occurring in any one time in policy systems and sub-systems 
(Osborne 2010; 2006).  In a challenge to claims of a definite boundary between 
phases or stages of policy-making, NPG scholars stress continuity and pluralism 
both in the processes of public policy-making and the implementation of public 
policy and organisation of public service delivery.  
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While public administration scholars describe a significant shift in governance 
forms, the core insight from historical institutionalism is that older forms of 
governance continue to exist alongside newer forms to create complex, policy-
making service delivery structures (Dickinson,2016:41;  Beland and Powell 
2016; Beland, Rocco and Waddan (2016).  The social policy sector is no 
exception.  As governments contract out the provision of care to the non-
government sector while simultaneously encouraging delivery by the market, 
the result is “an ever more hybrid and variegated mixed economy of care where 
private and public, market and state, paid and unpaid, formal and informal 
become inextricably intertwined” (Glucksman,2006:62).  In a world 
characterised by a greater diversity of actors in policy-making and 
implementation processes, the challenge of balancing and negotiating 
betweenvalues, some of which are incommensurable, becomes increasingly 
important (Dickinson,2016:55).   
 
Traditionally, politics has been regarded as the “authoritative allocation of values 
for society” (Easton,1965:3), yet the role of politics within the policy 
implementation literature remains under theorized (Barret and Fudge,1981; 
Moe,1989; Patasnik,2008). The interplay of politics and implementation has 
fallen between political scientists concerned with bureaucratic politics and 
public administration researchers interested in the organisation of public sector 
structures.  Yet choices about bureaucratic structure are “not matters that can be 
separated off from [politics], to be guided by technical criteria of efficiency and 
effectiveness” (Moe 1990, p. 268). Others have argued that the structure of 
government is a p[olicy instrument itself as well as a question ofimplementation. 
Barzelay (2006) introduces the notion of public management policy to describe 
the process of political choicesabout the structure of government, with its 
implications for  shaping policy implementation across a range of sectors.  
 
The particular contribution of this paper is to highlight a dimension of pluralism 
that, although acknowledged by NPG scholarship (Osborne 2010, p.11), is 
underdeveloped in terms of understanding policy implementation: value 
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pluralism. In many ways value pluralism and its role in policy and administration 
scholarship is a hardy perennial (see, for example, Spicer 2010), but its critical 
role in policy implementation in a new public governance era has yet to be 
adequately explored. This paper  redresses this gap by investigating the 
relationships between value pluralism and organisational responses to value 
conflict by engaging with the recent promising insights provided in Skelcher and 
Smith (2015).    
 
Disability care regimes  
 
Internationally there have been significant shifts from directed social welfare 
delivery to mixed models – many of which utilise market principles. Ostensibly 
this shift has occurred with the aim of addressing fiscal and social issues 
(Osborne, 2010). Increasingly these models depend upon public sector markets 
(i.e. markets that are funded by the public sector, but delivered by providers 
from a range of sectors) (LeGrand, 2007). Public sector markets is an umbrella 
term; in reality there are diverse arrangements in place internationally which 
can fall within this conceptualization. For example, governments create ‘markets’ 
through contracting and tendering processes or by individualized care budgets 
(i.e. where individuals are given money to purchase services that meet their 
needs) (LeGrand, 2007; Needham and Glasby, 2015; Williams and Dickinson, 
2015). This has occurred in the UK, Germany and the Netherlands to name a few 
(Anttonen, 2012).  
 
This article uses the case of the Australian Disability Insurance scheme – a 
market based on individuals care packages and budgets. By enabling choice and 
control, proponents believe that personalized budgets and care markets improve 
wellbeing (LeGrand, 2007); rather than utilizing a ‘one size fits all’ service, 
citizens can (in principle) choose services that meet their needs.  
While personalisation of care services has been applied in a number of countries 
including the United Kingdom(Exworthy et al., 1999; Needham and Glasby, 
2014), the most ambitious national implementation of the approach to date is in 
Australia (Dickinson & Needham, Forthcoming, Carey et al). The Australian 
National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS) commenced national rollout in mid 
2016. The national scale, quantum of funding and complexity of the resulting 
 4 
care market structure under the NDIS is unprecedented (Dickinson & Needham, 
Forthcoming, Carey et al).  
 
Under the NDIS, approximately 460 000 individuals who have a significant and 
permanent disability will receive personalized funding budgets (Australian 
Productivity Commission, 2011; Collings et al., 2016). By providing choice and 
control, the Scheme is expected to deliver benefits to these individuals, their 
carers and families – extending the potential benefits of the scheme to hundreds 
of thousands more individuals (Australian Productivity Commission, 2011). 
 
The scheme will be fully implemented across Australia by 2019, including in 
urban, rural and remote localities and across a diverse range of disability types 
(Australian Productivity Commission, 2011; Collings et al., 2016). Under the new 
‘personalised’ model individuals are given funding packages, determined by their 
level of need and self-defined goals, with which to purchase services (Australian 
Productivity Commission, 2011). This is anticipated to secure choice and control 
for the person with a disability. The Australian Productivity Commission argue 
that the NDIS will replace a piecemeal and inequitable disability services system 
(Australian Productivity Commission, 2011). Thus the NDIS represents a shift 
from a fragmented block-funded system, to a personalised model whereby 
individuals are given funding packages determined by their level of need and 






Implementation of the NDIS commenced in 2013 with broad public and political 
support after a highly effective community-led campaign (Thill, 2015).  Soon 
after, the Commonwealth Labor Government was voted out, leaving 
implementation in the hands of a (conservative) Liberal National Party (LNP) 
Coalition Government that, while ostensibly committed to the reform, was not 
the architect of the NDIS (Bonyhady 2014; Cary and Matthews,2016; KPMG 
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2014).  The combination of strong community support, a change in government, 
complex governance and funding arrangements, and an implementation process 
that involves transitioning existing State and Territory programs into an entirely 
new national scheme makes the NDIS what Yin (2014) calls a ‘critical’ case 




The policy implementation literature has traditionally viewed implementation as 
a process of “assembling numerous and diverse program elements” (Patashnik 
2008, p. 5), with public administration and management scholars focusing on 
administrative issues and the capacity of bureaucracies and/or policy networks 
engaged in policy implementation.  In doing so it has largely side-stepped 
questions of how politics drives or disrupts implementation, leaving questions of 
politics in the hands of political scientists who have focused on bureaucratic 
politics rather than the politics of structural organisation and implementation 
(Moe 1990; 1989). With the exception of scholars such as Moe (1990; 1989) and 
Patashnik (2008), in the American context, this has led to a serious gap in 
understanding how politics shapes implementation.    
 
Values 
An important element of politics is how we value things; in alternative terms, 
reaching public political positions on how we should judge the goodness of 
things such as actions, situations, outcomes.  In the conclusion to his 
foundational text The New Public Governance, Osborne (2010, p. 419) argues that 
as public administration moves toward a new paradigm, it is important to 
understand the diverse sets of values that underpin specific modes of service 
provision because values orient political action and serve as the basis for choice 
(Stewart 2009, p. 23).  In other words, if you want to understand the effects of 
politics, you need to understand the values that structure both means and ends.    
 
This is particularly true for the delivery of social policy which encompasses 
complex human services. Here, different systems of provision operate at the 
 6 
same time, and the diverse logics underlying these different principles of 
provision may oppose rather than reinforce each other (Glucksman 2006, pp. 62-
63; Knijn 2000,p. 232 Indeed, one of the core insights of Richard Titmuss’ 
pioneering work in social policy was that the means, and not just the ends, of 
delivering human services was a value-laden undertaking).  Klijin et al. (1997) 
note that there are often differences between values at the institutional level and 
values at the operational level. For example, institutional level values may 
operate around long-term goals while operational level values might centre on 
speed and/or efficiency.  Irrespective of how these values differ, the point is well 
made that within a networked environment a plurality of values will inevitably 
exist and these will at times be convergent, divergent, productive and 
unproductive. 
 
In discussing value conflicts, some definitional tidying up is required between 
values in conflict and incommensurable values.  These are two distinct things, 
and both are relevant to politics in public administration.  In the first, things are 
valued on the same scale but the struggle or conflict is over their distribution. 
Conventional policy analysis employs the expected theory of utility to provide a 
guide as to how this conflict should be resolved; it produces a result, even if in 
practice the political system works less than perfectly in reaching that point. 
 
In this version of value conflict, all goods and actions in the policy analysis are 
being valued in the same way.  The other version of value conflict is about 
commensurability, and the extent to which values can actually be ‘weighed’ on 
the same scale. That is, how can certain requirements of justice and rights, for 
example, be considered against someone’s well-being or welfare? 
 
Policy analysis cannot provide useful guidance on how to balance these sort of 
conflicting values as they do not allow for a rate of exchange and trade-offs.  This 
creates a serious dilemma of values for the politics of policy implementation in 
networked and complex policy environments: no policy instrument or 
organizational design exists to guide or tell what to do.  This absence has 
seriously implications for resolving resolving value conflicts, which emerge from 
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politics, during  implementation.  Further, whilst democratic deliberation about 
policy goals may hold the prospect of people adjusting their values to 
accommodate a common set of policy goals and objectives, for policy 
implementation no such option is available. Value conflicts of this type need to 
be managed  both politically and organisationally.  
 
Organisational responses to value conflict 
It is practically relevant to distinguish the commensurability problem as a 
version of value conflict because it connects to questions of organisational 
hybridity; how organisations are structured to preserve, protect, advance or 
separate different values in particular situations in order to limit the negative 
consequences of tensions and conflicts for effective policy implementation. 
Recent insights from Skelcher and Smith (2015) can be used to develop further 
the connections between the politics of incommensurable values and policy 
implementation.  Although they take an Institutional Logics Approach, their 
approach to the term ‘plurality of normative frames’ is consistent with the value 
pluralism outlined here.  In several ways, the problem of value conflict also 
mirrors that of multiple rationalities, well-rehearsed in public administration 
(Hoppe 2002). 
 
Value pluralism is a driver of organisational hybridity (Fossestøl et al. 2015, p. 
291; Skelcher and Smith 2015, p. 434). Different hybrids are created by the 
actions of agents who engage in strategies of organisational and institutional 
‘bricolage’ for the purpose of managing value conflicts and avoiding adverse 
consequences for effective implementation and service delivery, what Skelcher 
and Smith (2015, p. 442) call a ‘blocked’ organization.  For example, values may 
be separated by different organisations, or segmented into different 
compartments within the same organization.  Skelcher and Smith (2015) also set 
out hybrids that blend or assimilate values in conflict, although it is not clear 
how these types would work for incommensurable values.  
 
Organisational responses to value conflict, a process known as hybridisation, fall 
into three broad categories.  In the first, a core value is selected and asserted as 
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the mission of an organization at the apex of a hierarchy; second, values may be 
combined in some way, inter- or intra-organisationally, with an institutional rule 
in place for arbitrating on conflicts; thirdly, there is a contingency approach 
where informal and fluid organisations are formed, often temporarily, for the 
purpose of managing value conflict at a particular stage of the implementation 
process. These strategies are not mutually exclusive, and critically it is in the 
nature of the local contexts of any value conflict situation that explains their 
genesis.  Using the case of the NDIS, this paper aims to enhance understanding of 
hybridisation in public sector organisations by focusing on the impact of politics 
during the implementation process. 
 
Research Design and Methods 
This paper draws on data from a longitudinal study of the implementation of the 
NDIS (UNSW Human Ethics Grant number G160892).  The study aims to 
investigate implementation with a particular focus on how governance 
structures enable and/or constrain the sort of policy learning and change that 
are necessary for successful implementation.  The study utilizes a case study 
research design because it enables us to investigate these changes in-depth and 
in their real-life contexts (Yin 2014).   Specifically, this paper draws on semi-
structured interviews conducted with individuals working in the Australian 
Public Service who played a role in determining the governance structures of the 
NDIS after the relevant legislation was passed as well as relevant policy 
documents such as the 2011 Productivity Commission report, Disability Care and 
Support. 
 
We began with purposive sampling of key individuals in charge of an initial NDIS 
Taskforce established within the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet in 
2013.  This was followed by interviews with the NDIS implementation group 
within the Department of Human Services – the group charged with overseeing 
and coordinating the implementation of the NDIS at the national level. 
Participants were identified by the director of the group to provide a wide range 
of views on the implementation of the NDIS.  In total, 26 semi-structured 
interviews were conducted.  Interviews were recorded and transcribed 
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verbatim.  Themes covered in the interviews included: decisions regarding the 
governance structure of the NDIS; deviations from the structure proposed by the 
Productivity Commission in their report; and the impact of the new LNP 
Government on the design and implementation of the NDIS.  Data was analysed 
using a thematic approach (Blaikie 2010).  ‘Like’ data were grouped together to 
form categories and subcategories.  These categories were developed into more 
substantive themes by linking and drawing connections between initial 
categories and hypothesizing about consequences and likely explanations for the 
appearance of certain phenomena (Strauss 1987).  This was done through 
discussion between the team.  In the refining of themes for publication, selective 
coding was carried out, whereby transcripts were revisited with the explicit 
intent of finding further linkages and connections between the central issue 
being explored and other themes.  
 
Values embedded in the design and implementation of the NDIS  
As noted earlier, value choices structure decisions about both ends and means.  
For the NDIS, the values that underlie bureaucratic provision (equal treatment, 
fairness, justice) have shaped broad policy objectives, while values that underlie 
market provision (efficiency, effectiveness), professional provision 
(personalisation) and the principal of financial sustainability have shaped, and 
continue to shape, implementation decisions.   
 
Prior to the introduction of the NDIS, the type and extent of services available to 
people with disability varied from State to State.  A desire to provide all eligible 
Australians with a consistent level of support regardless of where they lived 
(equal treatment) was a driving force behind the introduction of what would be 
a National Disability Insurance Scheme (Australian Productivity Commission, 
2011). 
Essentially the high level story about the NDIS is almost inarguable.  People with severe 
and chronic conditions have been underfunded and suffered from a disjointed and  
fragmented service system for years (P6).  
I think the intent is that we’ll by and large have national consistency…in decision making 
around the scheme and what people are able to access…[and] the way in which it’s  
delivered (P2).  
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The importance of fairness and justice as policy objectives can be seen in 
statements from design documents for the scheme, such as: 
The current disability support system is underfunded, unfair, fragmented, and inefficient, 
and gives people with disability little choice and no certainty of access to appropriate  
supports (Productivity Commission 2011, p. 2).  
The more concrete policy objective of lifetime care embedded in the NDIS is an 
expression of fairness and justice. 
 
While values were commensurate during the legislative process, in 
implementation divergent values have emerged.  This is not unexpected because 
the logic of political mobilization and the logic of implementation are different 
(Mosse,2004:663).  During the policy development phase, a diverse group of 
actors may support a particular policy goal (such as more choice and control for 
service users) for different reasons.  In relation to disability services, many 
people with disability value choice for intrinsic reasons because in choosing they 
are able to exercise control and agency, and being able to exercise control and 
agency is valued in itself, regardless of the policy outcome.  However many 
politicians and bureaucrats value choice for instrumental reasons 
(Nevile,2016:273-275).    For example, in its Inquiry Report, Disability Care and 
Support, the Productivity Commission (2011:357) argued that “an absence of 
genuine choice tends to result in lower quality and more costly services, less 
product variety and less innovation” because the ability of service users to act 
like consumers broadens the scope for competition and hence provides greater 
pressure for responsive, high quality services.  However the implications of 
differing justifications usually manifest when broad policy goals (more choice) 
are translated into specific design parameters.   
 
In the case of the NDIS, the values that have influenced decisions about how the 
scheme will be implemented are a mixture of values underlying market 
provision (efficiency, effectiveness) and professional provision (personalisation), 
which in the NDIS is expressed as ‘choice and control’.   As noted previously, the 
NDIS is based on an actuarial, or insurance, based approach.  This means the 
principal of financial sustainability that underlies the scheme is linked to 
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efficiency in that financial sustainability is weakened if costs regularly exceed 
expected levels.   
One of the things that really struck me is how much that budgeting and finance function 
drives an awful lot of what happens…because the overall success of the NDIS is very  
dependent on its financial viability (P6).     
 
This is likely to be a source of considerable value conflict over time. 
Yeah, so… costs were quite high in the early days of the NDIA [National Disability Insurance 
Agency]. We did a bit of work with them, and some of the reasons for that was they put through 
their high cost people first. So…some of the things the NDIA can do is have a look at the 




Because the principle of financial sustainability is so important, efficiency has 
driven a number of implementation decisions, such as the decision to outsource 
audit functions where ‘there was a general consensus that outsourcing auditing 
was going to be more efficient’ (P15), the decision to co-locate local NDIA offices 
with existing Centrelink offices where ‘co-location was very much [done] to 
minimise accommodation costs’ (P24), and the decision to outsource Local Area 
Coordinators  which was ‘driven by the fact that governments have…a staffing 
cap that won’t be exceeded’ (P2).  Hence, while values evident at legislation were 
ones of fairness and equal treatment, early in implementation these began to 
shift to efficiency. 
 
Managing value conflict 
As discussed earlier, tension between the values which shape choices about 
means and ends are inevitable (Stewart 2009, p. 186) and the NDIS is no 
exception.  One obvious source of tension arises from the desire for equal 
treatment and a commitment to choice and control for service users.  Prior to the 
NDIS, many State government programs were funded by block grants where 
money went to a service delivery organisation and the organisation made 
decisions about how that block of money would be spent.  Consequently, ‘in New 
South Wales people could apply for money and they would have a window 
replaced or their washing machine repaired…and in another State we had dog 
food being funded and medicines being funded…[none of which are] in the scope 
of the scheme’ (P20).   
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[There is a] DSS policy view that the scheme doesn’t turn itself into an income support 
program.  It’s a lot of money and it’s got to buy support that is identifiably related 
someone’s disability needs…So you want some discretion so people can innovate [but it] 
can’t be too discretionary so that the person next to you can buy something that  
effectively you’d have to buy with your own income (P19).  
Hence, value conflict exists around the extent to which choice and control should 
be allowed under the scheme and the priority placed on ensuring scheme 
sustainability and budget control. The latter is driven particularly by 
government agendas and politics, with ‘cost blow out’ featuring prominently in 
the Australian media coverage of the scheme (see, for example, Morton 2016; 
Cullen 2013). 
 
Tensions can also arise between personalisation (choice and control) and 
efficiency, as occurred in the implementation of participant planning.  When the 
NDIA started the process of drawing up plans with participants in trial sites, they 
set themselves specific targets in terms of the time taken to process eligible 
individuals.  However the NDIA soon discovered that the majority of participants 
wanted to spend more time than they had expected thinking about their plans, 
‘wanting to ensure that their plans are right for them… [Consequently] some of 
the targets around getting plans signed up sort of trailed off a little’ (P2).  
 
Public servants often deal with value conflict through firewalls or structural 
separation, what Skelcher and Smith (2015, p. 440) characterise as segmented or 
segregated hybrids.  While there are many examples of structural separation, 
within the Commonwealth Department of Social Services (DSS) and between DSS 
and the NDIA, there is little evidence that this structural separation is a 
technique used to manage value conflict.  Rather, structural separation is 
consequence of the complexity of a collective implementation process where 
‘nobody owns the entire thing’ (P6) and nobody has ‘the full picture of what’s 
actually happening in the Commonwealth or in the States…but we can work 
together at executive levels to keep the ship sailing’ (P18).  Similarly within DSS 
different units focus on specific issues, such transitioning funding and programs 
into the NDIS, quality and safeguards, and communications, but these issues are 
discussed at departmental meetings.  
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[Q]uality and safeguards was an issue right from the very beginning…It was a massive 
piece of work.  It was done in a different branch to the one I worked in, but it came to all  
the meetings, of course (P11).   
The only exception is the decision to have the Commonwealth deal with 
complaints against providers, where it was thought to be more appropriate for 
there to be a clear organisational separation between the agencies delivering 
front-line services and the agency with responsibility for reviewing the actions 
or decisions of those agencies.  This decision was taken because it was felt that 
people with disability whose lives have been controlled by State government 
agencies for many years wanted ‘a certain level of separation of powers so that 
they’ll deal with the agency for their plan and their supports, but they will be 
able to go somewhere else to make a complaint’ (P15).  In addition, there will be 
a separation between the NDIA as the implementation arm and the national 
regulator which will be located at the Commonwealth level (DSS 2016). 
 
Organisations may also accommodate conflicting values by adopting some of the 
symbols and practices of one set of values, while a core set of values remain 
dominant: what Skelcher and Smith (2015, p. 441) characterise as an assimilated 
hybrid. Alternatively, they may combine elements of two (or more) sets of values 
to create a new, contextually specific organisational structure and identity: what 
Skelcher and Smith (2015, p. 442) characterise as a blended hybrid.  While 
questions remain about the extent to which service users will be allowed to 
exercise choice and control in the NDIS (see, for example, Nevile 2016, p. 275), 
for the first time, people with disability are able to participate in decisions about 
what sort of services they will receive, as well as being given a choice about who 
will provide those services.  As discussed in the following section, one value, such 
as efficiency, does not always dominate.  Consequently the NDIS cannot be 
characterised as an assimilated hybrid.  Neither can it be characterised as a 
blended hybrid because the values underlying design and implementation 
remain separate and distinct: they have not evolved into a new singular identity.   
 
It is also clear that tension between the values underlying design and 
implementation have not led to organisational dysfunction (the blocked hybrid).  
Commonwealth/State negotiations are hard at the best of times, but when you are 
working on such a huge reform…I think the biggest feat is getting the States and the 
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Commonwealth to agree on this and negotiating the trial agreements…It’s taken us 18 
months of negotiating to get there and we celebrated last week…because that is amazing  
(P17). 
 
The NDIS does not fit into the five ideal types of hybrids outlined by Skelcher and 
Smith. We argue that this stems from the politics surrounding, and interjecting, 
in the implementation process.  Skelcher and Smith’s (2015, p. 445) observation 
that the ‘likelihood of a blocked hybrid may be moderated by…the value 
commitment of organizational members’ provides a clue as to how this process 
works.  Hybridity encompasses identity as well as organizational structure 
(Meyer et al. 2014:863; Mulllins and Acheson 2014, p. 1613).  An individual’s 
social identity derives from membership of a particular social group, such as a 
bureaucracy, which provide a set of values that guide action as well as shaping 
organizational structures (Meyer et al. 2014, p. 863).  For public servants, a 
fundamental part of their social identity is carrying out the wishes of the 
government of the day, which means accepting vertical hierarchy (doing what 
the Minister wants) and the necessity of compromise when negotiating with 
horizontal authority to progress Ministerial priorities.  In other words, in the 
case of programs such as the NDIS which are ‘incredibly politically sensitive’ 
(P20), it is politics that determines which value should dominate in situations of 
value conflict.   
 
The effect of politics on value choices 
An analysis of the impact of politics on value choices in the NDIS reveals that, 
while the impact of politics is multi-directional (that is, at times politics will 
reinforce a particular value, at other times it will weaken that value), it is never 
ambiguous.  For example, the National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013 
came into effect six months out from a Federal election and the minority Gillard 
Labor Government decided to bring forward the staged roll-out by one year, so 
that implementation in certain sites would commence before the 2013 Federal 
election.   
The Prime Minister and the Commonwealth Minister wanted to basically have trials and 
launches in place ahead of the election and have it signed off ahead of the election  
(P22).  
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In its report, Disability Care and Support, the Productivity Commission (2011, p. 
928) recommended a start date of July 2014 which it believed was ‘tight…but 
realistic and achievable’.  Bringing the start date forward by 12 months placed 
additional pressure on an already tight timeframe.  In talking about the policy 
work currently being done in the DSS, it was clear that senior bureaucrats were 
aware of the risks but also understood the political realities.   
[T]he government was forced to make some hasty decisions to get it over the line before 
an election…[But] if they hadn’t done that it might never have got up…If the government 
had procrastinated and said, ‘alright, we can’t take this to an election, we’ve got to get all 
these things right’, I don’t know whether it would have got over the line.  I don’t think it  
would have to be honest (P17).   
In recommending that the NDIS be fully funded by the Commonwealth, the 
Productivity Commission was motivated by a desire to create a funding stream 
that was immune from the politics of Federal/State relations (Productivity 
Commission 2011, pp. 644 & 678).   While some States were happy with the 
prospect of the Commonwealth assuming responsibility for funding disability 
support services (P22), the Commonwealth Government was not prepared to cut 
its own spending in other areas while the States, who have constitutional 
responsibility for disability services, were able to use money previously 
allocated to disability services on their own policy priorities (P24, P19).  Faced 
with the need to negotiate a joint funding agreement with State and Territory 
governments in the lead-up to the Federal election, Commonwealth public 
servants were forced to make decisions that weakened both efficiency and the 
desire for national consistency.  For example, the States, motivated by their own 
political concerns, would not agree to any deal unless individuals currently 
receiving assistance under State-funded programs would receive assistance 
under the NDIS, even if they could not demonstrate the level of need deemed 
necessary under the original Productivity Commission model (P24).   
At other times, political considerations reinforced the importance of efficiency, 
even at the expense of effectiveness.  For example, as part of joint 
Commonwealth/State funding arrangements, the Commonwealth agreed to fund 
all of the costs associated with the NDIA during the trial phase and 40 per cent of 
program costs; that is, the cost of peoples’ plans.  Concerned about potential cost 
blow-outs, the Abbott Government  
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put a lot of pressure on the NDIA to keep costs down and I think their response to 
that…was that they did interim plans and they did low cost interventions…So, what they 
might get is a new wheelchair…what they probably need is homecare, support, someone 
to get them to work or community participation, all of which is incredibly expensive  
(P24).   
Mullins and Acheson (2014, p. 1613) note that hybridisation may entail various 
adaptive responses, including accepting trade-offs such as the one described 
above.  Our interviews reveal that senior public servants are aware that they are 
making an adaptive response; that is, they are aware of the need to balance 
efficiency and effectiveness, while recognising that achieving an optimal balance 
may only be possible in the medium to long-term because of the political 
importance of controlling costs.  For example, in the discussion about efficient 
pricing, a senior Commonwealth bureaucrat noted that in moving towards an 
efficient price the government has to ensure that the efficient market price 
allows for the provision of high quality services.   
 [It] is quite critical that our policy people…ensure that by driving the price down to what  
[is seen as] an efficient price, that they don’t drive shonky activities (P18).   
 
However Commonwealth politicians have not always chosen efficiency over 
effectiveness.  A political desire to avoid poor quality service provision (which 
reinforces effectiveness) has characterised decision making from the very 
beginning of the implementation process where the scheme’s high political 
salience has generated correspondingly high levels of political risk.  The 
Productivity Commission believed the Federal Treasurer should be responsible 
for the NDIS because of ‘the critical need to ensure strong cost controls, its 
insurance characteristics [and] long run sustainability’ (Productivity 
Commission 2011, p. 432), and because 
they were very worried it would get dumbed down and just become another kind of 
discretionary program where ministers…tell agencies what to do and they really wanted 
a degree of independence from ministerial direction so what was funded wasn’t driven  
by political considerations (P19).  
With the memory of the home insulation disaster (where four young men died 
while installing ceiling insulation) still fresh in the minds of the public, the 
Gillard Government was not prepared to once again give policy responsibility to 
a central agency which had little or no experience of policy implementation 
(P25).  
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We had seen what happens when you’ve given the Environment Department the home 
insulation program and they didn’t have the expertise to run the program.  So I think the 
government was pretty thoughtful about, ‘well where is the capacity to do something of  
this size?’ (P21).  
 
Politics is often seen as weakening implementation efforts (Matland 1995, p. 
148).  However in the case of the NDIS, politics plays an essential role because it 
is the mechanism that allows diverse sets of values to co-exist.  For the NDIS, 
successful implementation depends upon organisational hybridity because of the 
interdependence of incommensurable values.  For example, as discussed earlier, 
the values that lie behind market provision and professional provision are often 
in conflict, but in the NDIS, choice and control for participants is dependent on 
market provision.  
[A]t the end of the day we need the market to be there.  I mean there is no choice and 
control for participants if there’s no services being delivered in a particular area, and the  
whole fundamental underpinning is, ‘let’s improve choice and control’ (P2).    
Similarly, long- term efficiency and effectiveness are dependent on the level of 
choice and control given to participants.  If participants do not have confidence 
that the scheme will continue to deliver the sort of supports that they need over 
their lifetime, they will tend to hang onto the services they currently receive 
even if their needs change over time.  On the other hand, if ‘people trusted the 
scheme and felt more in control of changing their supports around…there would 
be things that [they] wouldn’t need and would be happy to let go, because there 
were these other things that better served [them]’ (P2).   
Conclusion 
In their discussion of hybridisation of third sector housing and support 
organisations in Northern Ireland, Mullins et al. (2014, p. 1613) argue that 
‘critical theorisation works best by focusing on dynamic processes of 
hybridisation rather than static descriptions of hybridity’.  Denis et al. (2015, p. 
285) also call for future research that moves beyond a typology of various 
response strategies to develop a more nuanced understanding of the processes 
that shape these responses, highlighting the need for a cross-disciplinary 
perspective that addresses the gap in organisation studies (a lack of attention to 
the crucial role of politics) and public administration (a more explicit focus on 
implementation).   In this paper we answer this call by exploring the effect of 
 18 
politics on the value choices of senior public servants involved in the design and 
implementation of Australia’s National Disability Insurance Scheme.  As a 
scheme designed to provide a guarantee of life-time care for all eligible 
Australians through development of a mature market in disability services and 
the introduction of more choice and control for service users, the NDIS is 
situated in a hybrid public policy field and the values that underlie design and 
implementation reflect a mix of bureaucratic, market and professional provision.    
Our analysis shows that politics plays an essential role in facilitating 
implementation of a complex social policy that contains a number of 
incommensurable values because it allows these incommensurable values to co-
exist and adaptation to take place, thereby avoiding the creation of a blocked 
hybrid.  Furthermore, in the case of the NDIS, successful implementation 
depends upon continued co-existence because of the interdependence of these 
incommensurable values.   
 
References 
Barrett, S and C. Fudge 1981. Policy and Action. London: Methuen.  
Barrett, S. M. 2004. ‘Implementation studies: time for a revival?’, Public 
Administration, 82, 2, 249-262. 
Blaike, N. 2009. Designing Social Research, 2nd edn. Oxford: Polity Press. 
Bonyhady, B. 2014. The NDIS Vision; Delivering the Plan, St Laurence National 
Conference, Geelong, 11-12 August.  
Carey, G. and M. Mathews 2016. ‘Methods for Delivering Complex Social Services: 
Exploring adaptive management and regulation in the Australian National 
Disability Insurance Scheme’, Public Management Review, 
DOI:10.1080/14719037.2016.1148194 pp. 1-20. 
Collings, S., A. Dew and L. Dowse 2016. ‘Support planning with people with 
intellectual disability and complex support needs in the Australian National 
Disability Insurance Scheme’, Journal of Intellectual & Developmental 
Disability, 41, 3, 272-276.  
Cullen, Simon 2013, ‘Early figures show NDIS costs blowing out by 30 per cent’, 
ABC News, 20 November, available at: www.abc.net.au/news/2013-11-
 19 
20/early-figures-show-ndis-scheme-cost-blowout/5105304   accessed 11 
October 2016. 
Denis, J-L., E. Ferlie and N. Van Gestel 2015.  ‘Understanding Hybridity in Public 
Organizations’, Public Administration, 93, 2, 273-289.  
Department of Social Security (DSS) 2016. National Disability Insurance Scheme 
Quality and Safeguards Framework: Consultation Report, Canberra.  
Dickinson, H. 2016, ‘From New Public Management to New Public Governance: 
The implications for a “new public service”’, in J. R. Butcher and D. J. Gilchrist 
(eds), The Three Sector Solution: delivering public policy in collaboration with 
not-for-profits and business. Canberra:  ANU Press, pp. 41-60. 
Easton, D. 1965. A Framework for Political Analysis. Eaglewood Cliffs: Prentice 
Hall. 
Exworthy, M. and M. Powell 2004. ‘Big windows and little windows: 
implementation in the “congested state”’, Public Administration, 82, 2, 263-
281. 
Fossestøl, K., E. Breit, T. A. Andreassen and L. Klemsdal 2015. ‘Managing 
Institutional Complexity in Public Sector Reform: Hybridization in front-line 
service organizations, Public Administration, 93, 2, 209-306.  
Glucksman, M. 2006. ‘Developing an economic sociology of care and rights’, in L. 
Morris (ed.), Rights: Sociological perspectives. Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 55-
75.  
Head, B.W. and J. Alford 2015. ‘Wicked problems: Implications for public policy 
and management’, Administration & Society, 47, 6, 711-739. 
Hill, M. and P. Hupe 2009. Implementing Public Policy,   2nd edn. London: Sage. 
Hoppe, R. 2002. ‘Co-evolution of modes of governance and rationality: A 
diagnosis and research agenda’, Administrative Theory & Praxis, 24, 4, 763-
778.  
Klijn, E.-H. 1997. ‘An Overview’, in W. Kickert, E.-H. Klijn and J. Koppenjan (eds), 
Managing Complex Networks: Strategies for the Public Sector. London: Sage, 
pp. 166–191. 
Knijn, T. 2000. ‘Marketization and the struggling logics of (home) care in the 
Netherlands’, in M. Harrington Meyer (ed.), Care work: Gender, Class and the 
Welfare State. New York: Routledge, pp. 232-248.   
KPMG 2014. Interim Report: Review of the optimal approach to transition to the 
full NDIS. Canberra: KPMG.  
 20 
Matland, R. E. 1995. ‘Synthesizing the implementation literature: The Ambiguity-
Conflict model of policy implementation’, Journal of Public Administration 
Research and Theory, 5, 2, 145-174.  
Moe, T. 1990. ‘The politics of structural choice: towards a theory of public 
bureaucracy’, in O. Williamson (ed.), Organization Theory. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, pp. 116-153.  
Moe, T. 1989, ‘The politics of bureaucratic structure’, in J. Chubb and P. Peterson 
(eds), Can the Government Govern? Washington: The Brookings Institute, pp. 
267-392.  
Meyer, R. E., I. Egger-Peitler, M. A. Höllerer and G. Hammerschmid 2014 ‘Of 
bureaucrats and passionate public managers: Institutional logics, executive 
identities, and public service motivation’, Public Administration, 92, 4, 861-
885.  
Morton, Rick 2016, ‘NDIS facing $3bn cost blowout: Shepherd’, The Australian, 7 
March, available at: www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs/ndis-
facing.3bn-blowout-shepherd/news-
story/f1b1e0040bf254d1d3f0c87dc39dad4   accessed 11 October 2016.  
Mullins, D. and N. Acheson 2014. ‘Competing Hybridity: Third-Sector Housing 
Organisations in Northern Ireland’, Voluntas, 25, 6, 1606-1629. 
Nevile, A. 2016. ‘Redesigning procurement strategies for complex policy spaces’, 
in J. R. Butcher and D. J. Gilchrist (eds), The Three Sector Solution: delivering 
public policy in collaboration with not-for-profits and business. Canberra:  
ANU Press, pp. 265-284.  
OECD 2010, Making Reform Happen: Lessons from OECD Countries. Paris: OECD. 
Osborne, S. P. 2010. ‘Conclusions: Public governance and public delivery: a 
research agenda for the future’, in S. P. Osborne (ed.), The New Public 
Governance. Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 412-428.  
Osborne, S. P. 2006. ‘The New Public Governance?’, Public Management Review, 8, 
3, 377-387.  
Patashnik, E. 2008. Reforms at Risk: What happens after major policy changes are 
enacted? Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
Productivity Commission 2011. Disability Care and Support, Productivity 
Commission Inquiry Report No. 54. Canberra 
www.pc.gov.au/inquiries/completed/disability-support/report accessed 19 
July 2016. 
Skelcher, C. and S. R. Smith 2015. ‘Theorizing Hybridity: Institutional logics, 
complex organizations, and actor identities: the case of nonprofits’, Public 
Administration, 93, 2, 433-448.  
 21 
Spicer, M. 2014. ‘In defense of value pluralism in public administration’, 
Administration & Society, 46, 8, 1010-1019. 
Stewart, J. 2009. Public Policy Values. Houndmills, Palgrave Macmillan.  
Strauss, A. 1987. Qualitative Analysis for Social Scientists. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  
Thill, C. 2015. ‘Listening for policy change: how the voices of disabled people 
shaped Australia’s National Disability Insurance Scheme’, Disability & 
Society, 30, 1, 15-28. 
Yin, R. 2014. Case Study Research: Design and Methods. Thousand Oaks: Sage.  
